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Neil Gorsuch and the Return of Rule-of-Law Due 
Process 
By Nathan S. Chapman      Originally published at RealClear.com 
Something curious happened at the Supreme Court last week. While the country was 
glued to the Cirque du Trump, the rule of law made a comeback, revived by Neil 
Gorsuch, whose place on the Court may prove to be one of Trump’s most important 
legacies.  
Unlike the partisan gerrymander and First Amendment cases currently pending before 
the Court, immigration cases are usually long on textual analysis and short on grand 
themes. Accordingly, court-watchers didn’t have especially high expectations 
for Sessions v. Dimaya. 
Dimaya is a lawful permanent resident who was convicted of first-degree burglary and 
faced deportation. The conviction seemed to count as a crime that “by its nature, 
involves substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another 
may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, if the burglary were such a crime, he would be subject to deportation. 
Dimaya argued that the statutory provision was too vague to give him adequate notice, 
so deporting him would deprive him of liberty without due process of law. Although the 
Court had ruled three years ago that a similar federal criminal law was 
unconstitutionally vague, Dimaya’s case was distinguishable: The two laws were phrased 
a little differently; courts usually think burglary is an inherently dangerous crime; and 
aliens — even lawful resident aliens — don’t enjoy the full constitutional rights of U.S. 
citizens. 
But a bare majority of the Court concluded that the “substantial risk” of “physical force” 
provision was too vague to authorize a deportation — even for burglary. While the 
holding was perhaps unsurprising, Justice Gorsuch’s solo opinion, which provided the 
crucial fifth vote, was remarkable in every way. It reveals a lot about Gorsuch as a 
constitutional jurist and reintroduces a cross-partisan notion of due process as a 
guarantee of the rule of law. 
First, Gorsuch’s opinion was deeply originalist. His judgment was based on a searching 
review of legal materials that would have been familiar to jurists at the time of our 
country’s founding, including a number of early state and federal cases declining to 
apply vague statutes. His conclusion? The “void for vagueness doctrine … serves as a 
faithful expression of ancient due process and separation of powers principles the 
framers recognized as vital to ordered liberty under our Constitution.” Based on this 
opinion, Gorsuch appears to be every bit as committed to an originalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation as his predecessor, Justice Scalia, was — perhaps more so. 
Second, Gorsuch married careful historical scrutiny with candor and sensitivity for how 
our legal system has changed over time. This is where he and Justice Thomas parted 
ways. Thomas’s dissenting opinion provides a careful historical argument against 
invalidating vague laws for lack of due process. He thinks such laws may be forbidden by 
the separation of powers, but not by the Due Process Clause. And, in any case, he thinks 
the courts should rarely invalidate a vague law, choosing instead to decline to enforce 
where it does not clearly fit the facts. This is a sensible view of the historical material, 
but it gives no weight to numerous changes to the legal system since the Founding. One 
cannot return to the Founding era’s constitutional understanding on a retail basis 
without unbalancing subsequent wholesale legal changes. (This is putting aside 
important social, moral, economic, and political changes.) 
Gorsuch’s opinion, by contrast, deploys a subtler view of the relationship between 
historical understanding and the law today. He shows that many Founding-era jurists 
(though not all) believed resident aliens were entitled to due process. His analysis thus 
accounts for plural understandings at the Founding. He also shows that lawful 
permanent residents, by virtue of affirmative acts of Congress, enjoy a different “liberty” 
interest today than they did at the founding. The basic requirements of due process may 
not change, but underlying rights to “life, liberty, and property” might. Such changes 
would interact dynamically with due process claims. 
Gorsuch also questions the relevance of a strict distinction between criminal and civil 
cases. He notes that the Founding generation understood civil deprivations of rights to 
be subject to due process (as I have recently argued), and that today some civil 
punishments are more onerous than their criminal counterparts — even for the same 
conduct. One swallow does not a spring make, but Gorsuch appears to be more 
comfortable than other modern justices at incorporating legal change into his 
application of the original understanding of the Constitution. He avoids both the 
mistake of ignoring legal change altogether and that of sacrificing continuity of 
constitutional meaning on the altar of progress. Scholars such as Christopher Green 
have argued that such an approach, perhaps counterintuitively, may be entirely faithful 
to the original understanding of constitutional provisions.  
Third and perhaps most remarkably, Gorsuch uses this historical material to articulate a 
position that is potentially more far-reaching and more protective of individual rights 
than even the plurality opinion does. That opinion, penned by Justice Kagan and joined 
by the three other liberal members of the Court, extends due process to Dimaya in part 
because of their view of the importance of the right of continued residence. Gorsuch 
goes considerably further. His view of the Due Process Clause would require the 
legislature to set out clear laws before anyone is deprived of any legal interest in “life, 
liberty, or property.” 
Without that clarity, executive officials and courts wind up effectively exercising the 
lawmaking power reserved for the legislature, as Michael McConnell and I have 
argued elsewhere. In that case, the people have no notice and little say over the content 
of the law; rights are subject to the opinions — or political expediency — of unelected 
officials and judges. But due process of law was originally understood to guarantee that 
the deprivation of rights would be subject to law. 
Congress may not function as efficiently as many would like, but that is no excuse for 
executive officials or courts to supplant its constitutional role at the expense of people 
like Dimaya. As Justice Jackson said in his famous opinion in the Steel Seizure Case, the 
Due Process Clause, together with the president’s responsibility to enforce the laws, 
“signif[ies] about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of 
men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.”  
While the vision of due process Justice Gorsuch invoked differs from modern 
“procedural” and “substantive” due process, there is surely room for it alongside those 
doctrines. As Gorsuch’s analysis illustrates, rule-of-law due process doesn’t reliably lead 
to conservative or liberal results. It is not a panacea for perceived Supreme Court 
partisanship. But it may portend a return of the rule of law — within, and through, due 
process. 
Nathan S. Chapman is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Georgia. 
 
 
